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Abstract 
To protect critical resources in networked environments, it is important to quantify the likelihood of potential multi-
step attacks in attack graphs. Aimed at the problems that probabilistic incorrect computing caused by shared 
dependencies in nodes, a methodology for security risk analysis that is based on the model of attack graphs and the 
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) was presented, and the problem of probabilistic incorrect computing 
was solved successfully by proposing the probabilistic computing approach of accurate calculation and approximate 
calculation , While ensuring the accuracy of the probability of attack graph-based nodes, quickly Calculated the 
probability of each node, which can be adapted to a large-scale network. Reasonableness and effectiveness of 
proposed method was verified in the simulation. Compared with the related research, our approach can be adapted to 
a more complex attack graph, and had good scalability. 
Keywords: Attack Graphs; Shared Dependencies; Accurate calculation; Approximate calculation 
1. Introduction 
Currently, the methods of network attack are showing a trend of complexity and diverse with 
complexity of network systems. Attackers typically employ vulnerabilities to evade security measures and 
to gradually gain privileges and the final goal. When analyzing the security of an enterprise network, it is 
important to consider those multi-step attacks. Attack graphs are one of important tools for analyzing 
security vulnerabilities in enterprise network, and attack graphs is defined as follows. 
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Definition 1.  
Attack graph G=(CoĤCd,T,E) is the directed graph, Co is vertex set of initial conditions, Cd is vertex set 
of intermediate conditions, T is vertex set of exploitation. G satisfied the constraints:(1) E୴
((T×Cd)Ĥ((CoĤCd)×T));(2) (ġPre(t))ൽ( Post(ġ t)) for ൿtęT, Pre(t) is parent vertex set of t, and Post(t)
is child vertex set of t;(3) (ĢPre(c))ൽc for ൿcęCd.
Attack graph research has made a preliminary research results, and has achieved a number of prototype, 
such as TVA[1]ǃMulVAL[2]ǃNetSPA[3] and so on. Figure 1 is a simple example of attack graph, the text 
nodes represent the conditional nodes, and the oval nodes represent the exploit nodes. 
Fig. 1.An simple example of attack graph 
In an attack graph, there are many shared dependencies among attack paths because of the complexity 
of topology of attack graph. In an attack graph, there are many shared dependencies among attack paths 
because of the complexity of topology of attack graph. In Figure 1, for example, conditional node c10 can 
be obtained by an attacker using either of two exploit nodes e4 or e5. If the paths to e4 and e5 are 
independent, we can easily calculate the probability that an attacker might gain conditional node c10 to be:
P(e4)+P(e5)-P(e4)·P(e5). However, it is incorrect to assume that e4 and e5 are independent. It is easily seen 
that attack step e4 and e5 fully depends upon c7 in Figure 1, so the paths to e4 and e5 are not independent. 
In other words, assuming that all attack paths in an attack graph are independent will lead to unreasonable 
result in Probabilistic Computing of attack graph-based nodes. 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 
presents the acquisition method of basic data which are required in calculating the probability of each 
node, and calculation algorithm of calculating the probability of each node in attack graph. Section 4 
presents the simulation to verify the reasonableness and effectiveness of proposed calculation algorithm. 
Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses future work. 
2. Related Works 
Recently, there has been significant progress in standardizing and developing metrics for individual 
vulnerabilities, such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [4]. The key limitation of 
CVSS is that the computed scores represent only the likelihood of success for individual attack steps, 
without consideration of the probability of actions performed to attain the preconditions necessary for an 
attack step. 
Accounting for shared dependencies among attack paths, there are three solutions. One is assuming 
there are independent between any nodes, such as WANG, et al.[5] assumed that probabilities along 
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multiple paths leading to a node are independent in their probability calculation; Second is avoiding 
shared dependencies among attack paths by proposing the computing approach of maximum reachable 
probability, such as CHEN[6] Proposed the analysis of effective attack paths and did not calculate the true 
probability of each nodes; Third is combining attack graphs and individual vulnerability metrics, such as 
TRIGAUL, et al. [7-8] proposed converting attack graphs and the individual metrics into Bayesian 
Networks for computing the cumulative probability; HOMER, et al. [9] proposed an approach to solve the 
shared dependencies among attack paths by employing the notion of d-separation within a causal network. 
Comparing these three solutions, it is easily seen that the third solution is relative accuracy in 
calculating the probability of each node. But now, the probability model based on attack graphs is only in 
the initial stage, such as the probability model proposed by TRIGAUL, et al. [7-8] only solved the problem 
of probability calculation in theory, since the exact Bayesian network inference problem is NP hard, so 
the this method is almost impossible in actual probability calculation of attack graph nodes; HOMER, et 
al. [9] only considered the simple case of each exploit node just has just one child node, and the study 
result showed that this method was not adapted to large-scaled attack graphs by increasing of  the number 
of cyclic paths in attack graphs and elements in d-separation set. 
3. Probability Calculation Based On Attack Graphs 
We propose an approximate probability model combined by attack graphs and CVSS, which is adapted 
to large-scale attack graphs. We first estimate the maximum and the minimum probability for every node 
in attack graphs, then we will use the method of approximate calculation to calculate the maximum and 
the minimum probability of nodes, if the maximum and the minimum probability of these nodes are 
within the setting number. Otherwise, we will use the method of accurate calculation to calculate the 
probability of nodes. 
3.1. Acquisition of basic data 
For exploit node ei, we assume the individual probability d(ei) is obtained by converting vulnerability 
score provided by existing standards, such as the CVSS score, to probability. 
We obtain the individual probability d(ei) for exploit node ei through converting vulnerability score 
provided by National Vulnerability Database(NVD), which is followed CVSS standards. We use 
“AccessComplexity” property which is represented by “E” in NVD to character the individual probability 
for each exploit node. In according with recommendation of CVSS, the individual probability d(ei)  are as 
follows.
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3.2. Approximate calculation of probability 
When calculating the probabilities of each node, we first estimate the maximum and the minimum 
probability for every node in attack graphs. The following theorem describes how to calculate the 
maximum and the minimum probability for every node. 
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Theorem 1.  
For each node v in a given attack graph G, and t1, t2, … , tn are parent nodes of node v. If v T , then 
the maximum probability of node v can be calculated as max ( ) | ( )P v d v P t t pre v ˄ ˅ 0LQ^   ` , the 
minimum probability of node v can be calculated as min
( )
( ) ( )
t pre v
P v d v P t

 ˄ ˅ ; If dv C , then the 
maximum probability of node v can be calculated as max
( )
1 (1 ( ))
t pre v
P v P t

  ˄ ˅ , the minimum 
probability of node v can be calculated as min | ( )P v P t t pre v˄ ˅ 0D[^   `.
The proof is omitted because of space. We could calculate the maximum and the minimum probability 
for every node according to theorem 1. 
3.3. Calculation algorithm of approximate probability 
Here we consider how to combine the accurate calculation of probability and the approximate 
calculation of probability. There are many shared dependencies among attack paths because of the 
complexity of topology by increasing of depth of attack graph. So, it is important to consider how to 
avoid accurately calculating the nodes which are locating the deeper depth in attack graph. This 
calculation algorithm first use a breadth-first search strategy with a counter to accurately calculate the 
probabilities of the nodes which are preparing to calculate and whose depth in the attack graph are less 
than a setting number. Then we calculate the maximum and the minimum probabilities for other nodes 
according to theorem 1. If the maximum and the minimum probability of the node is within the setting 
number, then we will approximately calculate it, otherwise, we will accurately calculate it. The 
calculation algorithm of approximate probability is as follows. 
Algorithm 1.  (Calculation Algorithm of Approximate Probability) 
Input˖Attack Graph G, Depth L, Minimum error a
Output˖Probability of each node 
Method˖
˄˅ For each vęC0
˄˅ P(v)=1˗
˄˅ While there exist unprocessed nodes 
˄˅       While there exists an node whose predecessors are all processed 
˄˅          If h(v)> L Then
˄˅            Break;
˄˅          N=pre(v);
˄˅          If vęCd Then
˄˅            P(v)=1ˉaccurate_Prob( N );
˄˅          If vęT Then
˄˅            P(v)=d(v)  accurate_Prob(N);
˄˅     If h(v)>L Then
˄˅       Break;
˄˅ For each enter node t in the cycles 
˄˅       If h(t)>L Then
˄˅         Break;
˄˅       accurate_loop_Prob(G,t)˗
˄˅ If h(t)>L Then
˄˅       Break;
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˄˅While  there exist unprocessed nodes 
˄˅       While there exists an node whose predecessors are all processed 
˄˅         If vęCd Then
˄˅           max
( )
1 (1 ( ))
t pre v
P v P t

  ˄ ˅ ˗ min | ( )P v P t t pre v˄ ˅ 0D[^   `˗
˄˅           If max maxP v P v ad˄ ˅ ˄ ˅ Then
˄˅             P(v)=1ˉapproximate_Prob( N ); 
˄˅           Else
˄˅             P(v)=1ˉaccurate_Prob( N );
˄˅         If vęT Then
˄˅           max ( ) | ( )P v d v P t t pre v ˄ ˅ 0LQ^   `˗ min
( )
( ) ( )
t pre v
P v d v P t

 ˄ ˅ ˗
˄˅           If max maxP v P v ad˄ ˅ ˄ ˅ Then
˄˅            P(v)=d(v)  approximate_Prob(N);
˄˅           Else
˄˅             P(v)=d(v)  accurate_Prob(N);
˄˅       For each enter node t in the cycles
˄˅         loop_Prob(G,t)˗
We can get function approximate_Prob from function accurate_Prob by limiting the number of 
elements of d-separation set. Function accurate_loop_Prob and loop_Prob first convert cyclic paths to 
acyclic paths by deleting the Successor nodes of enter node in the cycles, then the methods of calculation 
are the same to the other nodes. 
4. Experiments 
In order to test the scalability of our approach, we constructed several testing models based on 
networks of varying sizes and complexity. Experimental environment is AMD Athlon 64 PC 3600+
˄2.09GHz˅ǃ2GB Memory and Window XP, and the algorithm is implemented by Eclipse3.4. The 
results of the experiments are showed in table 1. 
From the table 1, it can be seen that our algorithm is better than HOMER,s in run time, and our 
algorithm can be adapted to the more large-scale attack graphs. 
Table 1. the results of the experiments 
Testing 
model 
Number of 
network 
hosts 
Number of 
graph nodes in 
largest cycle 
Depth of 
accurate
calculation
Minimum 
error 
run-time˄Sec˅
Algorithm of 
HOMER[9]
Algorithm 
of this paper 
A 5 40 10 0.15 54 5 
B 10 57 15 0.10 4622 735 
15 0.15 287 
15 0.20 78 
C 20 83 0 0.15 58814 1452 
10 0.15 1439 
20 0.15 6229 
40 0.15 12036 
8   YE Yun et al. /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  10 ( 2011 )  3 – 8 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
We have presented an approach to calculate the probability of each node, using attack graphs and 
CVSS. We have successfully solved the problem of probabilistic incorrect computing by proposing the 
probabilistic computing approach of accurate calculation and approximate calculation, which can be 
adapted to a large-scale network. The simulation shows that our methods are reasonableness and 
effectiveness. 
For future work, we plan to create a more efficient algorithm and to continue experimentation using 
real-world network data, to better determine the reasonableness and effectiveness of this approach. 
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